This paper will discuss the challenges posed by modern conceptions of Hinduism -in particular Heinrich von Stietencron's conception of a "collection of religions" and Romila Thapar's application of Benedict Anderson's theory of "imagined communities" to Hinduism-to the European style of religious studies, particularly at the undergraduate level.
Wherever we fall in the emic/etic, outsider/insider debate, in the course of our observations and descriptions of religious beliefs and practices, we must take as our watchword the warning of the renowned scholar of Mahayana Buddhism, Paul Williams, to avoid the "essentialist fallacy," which " [gives] rise to the feeling that because we use the same word so there must be some unchanging core, perhaps a type of essence, to be identified by the relevant definition" (WILLIAMS 2009:2) . I refer to this as the principle of "no center." When one is presented with this principle, it seems so common sense as to be a truism, and yet we fall into the essentialist fallacy so easily that we often do not realize it. In fact, this is the main reason why I have chosen to concentrate on Hinduism to the exclusion of all other Indian traditions: it challenges the essentialist fallacy in ways no other religion does.
Since defining "religion" is no simple task, I will state my definitions axiomatically, rather than arguing for their suitability as opposed to other definitions. The reader is free to disagree, but within the confines of the argument presented here these definitions are actual. First, there is what I refer to as the "anthropological definition", which basically matches the one proposed by Melford Spiro (quoted by Richard F. Gombrich in the introduction to his classic study on rural Ceylonese Buddhism): "an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings" (GOMBRICH 1991:12) . This definition works best for Hinduism at what Gombrich calls the "affective" Romila Thapar applies Benedict Anderson's theory of "imagined communities" to contemporary, highly politicized Hinduism (what she terms "syndicated Hinduism"), but for our purposes it applies equally as well to religious studies, as the "religions" (Hinduism and otherwise) commonly taught to undergraduate students of religious studies in the West are more often than not "imagined communities": ideal versions of what the religions should be, based on an approach that is heavy on textual analysis and light on anthropology 1 . A close consideration of Hinduism can bring this to light in ways other religions cannot, for, as Thapar herself says, Hinduism is especially "amorphous" (THAPAR 1989:210) . "Amorphous" is as a good a term as I have ever heard to describe how the European student of religious studies views Hinduism. The "definition" of Hinduism he is handed generally consists of explanations of the "caste system," reincarnation, ahimsa (with special emphasis on vegetarianism), the four ashramas, the four yogas, the Upanishadic dicta, monism, the identity of Brahman with atman, and moksha as the ultimate goal of Hinduism 2 . Usually this Hinduism is analogous in his mind with Buddhism (and both of them are seen through the lens of European Christianity, whether he considers himself a Christian or not): moksha corresponds to nirvana, tat tvamasi to the Four Noble Truths, the four yogas to the Noble Eightfold Path, and Brahman 1 Before I proceed, allow me to emphasize that I am talking about primarily undergraduate courses, but of course at least a few undergraduate students go on to become graduate students, and often have to unlearn a great many things before they learn. I would also like to emphasize that I am not saying there are no anthropological or ethnographical approaches used in the teaching of Hinduism (or "world religions") at the undergraduate level.
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A cursory perusal of four quite good introductions to Hinduism the author had to hand (Flood, Hopkins, Knipe and Lipner) as just another way of looking at shunyata. When presented with contradictions in Hinduism-mono-and polytheistic tendencies, animal sacrifice, Tantra, dualistic and pluralistic ontologies, absence of reincarnation in the teachings of some traditions, etc.-he is assured by the Brahmin swamis that these are just aberrations of the "true" sanatana dharma, and by an unfortunate number of scholars, both Indian and European, that these are mere manifestations of "folk" Hinduism, as opposed to "textual" Hinduism, probably due to adulteration with "tribal" beliefs. The elite status of "textual religion" is purely a European, Christian, and more specifically Protestant, prejudice. It is an example of the emic flow of European Christianity stealthily invading the etic discourse of religious studies.
It is true that textual approaches to studying religion are waning as our anthropological and ethnographical data become more comprehensive. Gone are the days of Max Müller, yet he still casts a very long shadow. Gone too are the days when the Brahmin swamis exclusively controlled the flow of information, both East to West and back again, yet their books are still propagated in editions that critical, peer-reviewed books and journals just cannot match in terms of price and volume. Thus, this writer argues that there is a very real, lingering hangover from those days, and it still influences the undergraduate classroom in the form of textbooks on Hinduism that take what is sometimes called a "historical" approach. All of the textbooks I mentioned in footnote 2 employ this approach. So does Kim Knott's Hinduism: A Very Short Introduction, which seems to be the textbook of choice for both a "Religions of the World" course and a "Hinduism" course in the religion department at the University of Syracuse, where Bharati had his professorship for the last two decades or so of his life.
3 They each more or less begin with a discussion of the Indus Valley civilization, the Vedas, the Brahmanic sacrifices, then move on to Upanishadic thought, the Epics, the Gita, the Puranas (usually with emphasis on the Bhagavata), the bhakti movements, then (if you're lucky) you might get a very brief section on tantra, until finally a few remarks on modern Hinduism and (again, if you're lucky) the Hindu diaspora. The problem with this approach, in the author's opinion, is that it can be likened to asking a Slovak about what the average Slovak is like and getting a lecture on Great Moravia. The historical approach works well with "founder" religions because the founders and their companions are precisely those whom the devotee should imitate. Most This is not to say that historical textbooks on Hinduism have no value or should no longer be written, but it is this author's opinion that they should continue yielding pride of place to studies that start with everyday beliefs and practices, not with the Indus Valley civilization. Two good examples of this approach are Hirst and Zavos's Religious Traditions in Modern South Asia and the anthology Studying Hinduism in Practice, edited by Hillary P. Rodrigues. Though both are perhaps a bit challenging for the undergraduate student of "world religions," or even Hinduism specifically, I see no reason why their approaches cannot be adapted for the entry level. It is particularly strong medicine against European preconceptions.
This leads me to my idea of the "culture of Bible-readers." Just as it is nearly impossible to imagine Indian life without Indian religion, be it Hinduism or otherwise, we Europeans have not managed to extract the essence of religion and conceptualize it as a phenomenon apart from "everyday life" as well as we like to think (though we have certainly got farther in that than the Indians, for good or ill). If a Christian becomes interested in Hinduism, as with any other religion, the first thing he will ask is, "What should I read?" He is not talking about introductory textbooks here, but rather the scriptures. Unless perhaps he is Catholic or Orthodox, he will be used to a text-centric view of religion, and just as in Sunday school when he asks, "What does the bible say about such-and-such," when he comes to Hinduism he will look for a similarly authoritative text. Of course, he will find none. Instead, he will read a translation of the Rig Veda and try to puzzle out a lot of verses about clarified butter and gods whom very few Hindus even actively worship anymore, or, more likely, he will take Vivekananda's and Gandhi's advice and read the Gita or maybe an anthology of the "principle Upanishads" and go away, like even as venerable a figure as Hans Küng, saying something like, "As in the Hindu religions, so too in Christianity [. . .] there are different ways of salvation" (KÜNG 1985:226) .
The problem with a statement like this is that "salvation" is a Christian category, and there is good reason why moksha, mukti, kaivalya, etc., are all usually translated "liberation" and not "salvation." Furthermore, not all Hindu traditions are concerned with moksha at all. For the most part, the only person concerned with moksha is the ascetic, and despite his conspicuous presence in the West, in India he is firmly in a tiny minority. What Küng is conveying to us is the opinion of the Hindu " Küng.) This would be like a North Dakota Lutheran speaking for all of Christianity-with one key difference. If asked for justification of why his view of Christianity is valid, the North Dakotan would answer, "the Bible." A Hindu reformer like Vivekananda, however, might vaguely reply "the scriptures" (especially if he knows he is talking to a Christian audience), but he does not mean the same thing. The Protestant world is obsessed with "proof texts," another Christian category. The Hindu reformer's audience might go looking for proof texts to support his view in the Hindu "scriptures," but, as I said, they would either be confronted with poems about clarified butter or, if they read the Gita, a bunch of platitudes that can be interpreted almost any which way. To the Hindu ascetic, especially on the reformer model, the scriptures live in the guru. The Hindu religious path is experiential and experimental (the Sanskrit word veda is of course completely cognate with the Slovak "veda")-so much so that the modern Hindu loves to refer to his religion as "scientific" (something Bharati rails against in almost every one of his books, because to call a religion "scientific" is, of course, a contradiction in terms). Now, all of this is perfectly fine when we are talking about Protestant missionaries and Hindu reformers, but such emic thinking has no place in religious studies, yet our classrooms are rife with it. I once asked to see a textbook on "world religions" that a student had on his desk in the Lutheran secondary school where I currently teach. The book was used with the fifth-formers in their religious education courses. I saw that each chapter ended with a sort of chart detailing what each religion "said" about such things as "sin," "salvation," "the afterlife," etc. This is the application of emic Christian categories in what should be an etic context, and the only thing that made it forgivable was the fact that the book was being used in the context of Christian religious instruction, not religious studies. 4 It reflects the human love of analogy. Probably the most popular textbook given to American undergraduates by professors in their "world religions" courses is The World's Religions by Huston Smith. I was given it as an undergraduate. Smith uses analogy so often that sometimes it seems he talks about everything but "the world's religions." He seems to doubt his readers' ability to approach a system of thought on its own terms. 4 At the time of the writing, I have not been able to locate a copy of this book. It seems it is no longer in use among the students and the head of religious education was unable to find it. Therefore I regret I cannot include any publication information. At the time I saw it, I did not even check the title. Yet this is precisely what must be done. As much as is possible, each religion must be approached from zero, particularly in the area of linguistics. Having lived as an expatriate (what Americans prefer to call themselves rather than "immigrant") in Slovakia for over a decade, it is my firm belief that words which do not have a clear one-to-one translation should not be given one. For example, calling bryndzové halušky "dumplings with sheep cheese" is a pointless waste of time, as "dumplings with sheep cheese" will not call up an accurate image of the dish in the mind of the native English speaker. 5 A further explanation will be required, and if a translation requires further explanation to avoid mistaken impressions, it is not a translation at all. So with Hinduism: why we insist on using "religion," "idol," "worship," and "scriptures" when dharma, murti, puja, and shruti are available is beyond my ken. As Bharati suggested in the lecture I referred to above, most Sanskrit terms should be left as they are and explained in a glossary. Only by putting ourselves in the mindset of the indigenous practitioner of a religion can we ever begin to understand it: gruesome, arduous work no doubt, but in any area of cross-cultural dialogue there are no shortcuts. Analogy and essentialism are the tools of the intellectually lazy at best, and the intellectually dishonest at worst.
As I said at the beginning of this paper, no religion exposes the emic subconscious of European religious studies as well as Hinduism. Hinduism challenges our essentialist views not just where it itself is concerned, but also where "religion" in general is concerned. We are a culture of Bible-readers, whether we have ever picked up a Bible or not. As I have already said, in each religion we examine, we look for the holy book and try to find out what it "says" about the Christian categories that concern us. We read about Brahman (or, more often than not, Vivekananda's views on Brahman related second-or third-hand) and exclaim, "Ah! So Brahman is like God!" No, Brahman certainly is not like God. Brahman is like Brahman. Of course, Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Radhakrisnan, Gandhi, et al often called Brahman "God," but we have Bharati's famous idea of the pizza effect to thank for that, rather than anything found in the shruti. The temptation to analogy must be avoided diligently, both by the educator and the student. This is so much more the case in terms of philosophical concepts like Brahman and God than in terms of food. "Dumplings with sheep cheese" has no prior connotation in English-it will not call up any clear picture at all-while "God" has millennia of cultural baggage behind it. The reader might well ask, however, if some intercultural understanding of the Vedantic Brahman as "God," and viceversa, might not someday be reached? Indeed, would it not be desirable? Must the two concepts remain incompatible, and indeed incommunicable, cross-culturally? If it is indeed possible, it is this author's contention that it is only possible through clear communication.
When it comes to religious studies, the ends of sensitivity do not justify the means of wooly thinking and syncretism, something I share Agehananda Bharati's open contempt for (again, see the first chapter of Light at the Center).
One symptom of Hinduism's challenge to the Bible-reader's essentialist views, manifested through his historical and textual predispositions, is the ongoing debate over what Hinduism is. Hinduism Reconsidered, a very fine anthology of papers indeed, is devoted purely to this debate. In this anthology, Aditya Malik, in "Hinduism or Threethousand-three-hundred-and-six Ways to Invoke a Construct," identifies two basic approaches in the efforts of scholars to define Hinduism: that which tries to construct a "unity within Hinduism" (which I call the unitive approach), and that which emphasizes "historicity and multiplicity of meaning," which Malik identifies as the non-essentialist approach. On the extreme end of the non-essentialist school you have Heinrich von Stietencron. His paper "Hinduism: On the Proper Use of a Deceptive Term" begins with an etymological history of the terms "Hindu" and "Hinduism," demonstrating that their origins are ethnic and geographical rather than religious. The religious usage was imposed from without, first by Muslims, then by Christians, until it was finally picked up by "Hindus" themselves sometime in the 19th century. Stietencron proceeds to refute the typical "essentials" of Hinduism, which are supposed to give unity to this chaotic "religion," given by myriad textbooks and introductory treatments (including the ones I have already mentioned): the centrality of the Vedas, reincarnation, and the "caste system." He then comes to perhaps the most radically deconstructionist conclusion in all the anthology's theoretical papers: Hinduism, as a religion, quite simply does not exist. At face value, this may seem a non-essentialist position, and, regarding Hinduism, it is. Yet Stietencron in particular fell under Malik's criticism of those scholars affected by the "cognitive and cultural hegemony" of the West (MALIK 1997:22) , reflected mainly in the unitive approach. In reality, Stietencron's positon is very much essentialist: not when it comes to Hinduism, but when it comes to religion.
Stietencron, perhaps not wishing to throw the baby out with the bathwater, does not propose jettisoning the term "Hinduism" altogether. Instead, he proposes we conceive of "Hinduism" as meaning "a whole group of related but distinct religions" (STIETENCRON 1997:41) . In other words, he is perfectly satisfied awarding the status of "religion" to, say, the bhakti traditions, the various sannyasi orders, or Vedic Brahmanism-just not Hinduism. His intentions are honorable: as I have been saying, identifying Hinduism as a "world religion" leads Europeans to draw hasty parallels with Christianity, Judaism, or Islam, which causes breakdowns in communication. But is it not perhaps better for believe a South Asian scholar can do traditionally Western scholarship well. That is obviously untrue. On the contrary, I am skeptical because I think Malik is being unfair. The point of this paper, which I hope I have made clear, is that cross-cultural understanding in the field of religious studies can occur much more efficiently, and with fewer misunderstandings, if our concepts are refined and clarified, and outmoded approaches either abandoned or relegated to secondary status. This must begin in the classroom, and I see no reason why it should not begin at the undergraduate level. Since I am European (now geographically as well as culturally), I feel best equipped to offer criticisms and suggestions to the European side of the exchange. I will leave the South Asian side to those who understand its problems in the field better.
